Does Might Make Right? What We Get Wrong about Thucydides and Power

Does Might Make Right? What We Get Wrong about Thucydides and Power

By Debra DeLaet (Executive Director, Iowa United Nations Association)

In a January interview with The New York Times, President Trump declared that his own morality—not international law or global norms—served as the only constraint on his authority as commander in chief to use force in international politics. Stephen Miller, a top aide to President Trump, asserted in an interview with CNN's Jake Tapper, that power—not international morality—would dictate U.S. decisions about the U.S. use of force in its foreign policy. Mr. Miller said, “We live in a world, in the real world, Jake, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power… These are the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time.”

One thing Mr. Miller gets right is that claims that “might makes right” have deep historical roots. One of the most famous discussions of the idea that power trumps justice comes out of ancient Greece in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides (c. 460-400 BCE) served as an Athenian general during the Peloponnesian War. Exiled from Athens due to a key defeat in the city of Amphipolis for which he was blamed, Thucydides travelled throughout the region during the war and developed his history based on participant observations and eyewitness testimony representing diverse perspectives of the conflict among Peloponnesians.

The Melian Dialogue, a constructed diplomatic conversation between the Athenians and the Melians, is one of the most well-known portions of Thucydides’ history. The dialogue presents the asymmetrical power relations between imperialist Athens and the island of Melos which wished to remain neutral in the conflict between Athens and Sparta.

The Melian Dialogue is often used to illustrate the logic of might makes right—that the realities of power inevitably override appeals to justice. Due to their clear military advantages, the Athenians tried to convince the Melians to surrender without fighting. They made blunt appeals to power: 

For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians… or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

Recognizing that their pleas for fairness, justice, and peace would not override the Athenians’ assertion of power, the Melians tried to make more pragmatic appeals. They suggested that Athens, by violating respect for general principles, would “incur the heaviest vengeance” if they fell in the future.

But do you consider that there is no security in the policy which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?

The dialogue between the Athenians and Melians ended in a diplomatic failure. The Melians did not convince the Athenians to refrain from the use of force out of consideration for their long-term interests. But neither did the Athenians convince the Melians to submit to their threats out of a desire for self-preservation. The Melians chose resistance, and the Athenians made true on their promise to massacre those who fought and to enslave women and children. Imperial Athens emerged as the clear victor in this battle. Due to this outcome, the Melian Dialogue is commonly referenced as a cornerstone of realist foreign policy emphasizing the importance of power and downplaying the relevance of appeals to justice and law.

This popular understanding of Thucydides’ dialogue, which centers the Athenian perspective, glosses over critical details leading to more nuanced lessons for contemporary debates over the logic of might makes right. It is true that Athens conquered the Melians. It is also true that the Melians suffered exactly the violent consequences that Athenians said they would for failing to heed Athens’ warning to submit without fighting. But that is only one part of story. Despite recognizing their relative weakness and the deadly consequences of resistance, the Melians chose to fight. Athens, too, suffered for failing to heed the Melian warning that their actions would strengthen the forces already opposed to them and might turn allies into enemies. While Athens won the battle, it lost the Peloponnesian War to Sparta in the end. (It is worth noting for the record that Sparta, though victorious, was severely weakened by the war and ultimately vulnerable to Persia.)

Thucydides’ lessons from the Melian Dialogue remain relevant for contemporary debates over the use of force in international relations. The Trump administration is using might makes right logic to justify its disregard for international law. The U.S. intervention in Venezuela to capture President Nicolás Maduro and to bring him to New York to face trial for drug trafficking conspiracy charges represents a clear violation of international legal prohibitions against the use of force against sovereign countries and their leaders. The Trump administration’s recent insistence that it would take Greenland, by force if necessary, echoes the rhetoric of Athenian threats against the Melians. Acknowledging that it would be easier if Greenland or Denmark would agree to a deal without military action, President Trump nevertheless insisted “… one way or the other, we’re going to have Greenland.” At the Davos World Economic Forum in January, President Trump retreated from these threats when he said that the United States would not use 'excessive force' to obtain Greenland. His reversal did not acknowledge a commitment to the rules-based international order, and the Trump administration’s vacillation on other foreign policy decisions suggests that his Davos statement may not be the last word on the subject. His use of the phrase ‘excessive force’ begs the question of whether he is ruling out the use of all forms of force, especially because of the administration’s clearly stated position that its own morality and the blunt exercise of power is what matters in international politics.

As might makes right rhetoric is on the ascendance in current U.S. foreign policy, we would be wise to remember the actions and words of the Melians in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War. While the strong often do what they have the power to do, the weak don’t always accept what the powerful tell them they have to accept—at least not without a fight. Winning short-term battles does not necessarily enhance a country’s power  or security in the long-term. A country’s existing opponents may be strengthened when a country engages in military action in violation of international norms, and violations of principles of justice can turn allies into enemies. Political scientist Graham Allison describes a Thucydides trap whereby military overreach by a country disrupts the balance of power in ways that commonly lead to war and may ultimately benefit geopolitical rivals. The dangers of the Thucydides trap apply to military overreach by both standing and rising powers.

A careful reading of Thucydides suggests that the question of whether “might makes right” is not the primary question addressed by his history of the Peloponnesian War. In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians set aside considerations of justice—their claim is that power triumphs over justice, not that it produces justice. While the Melians acknowledged their wish that Athenians would consider justice, they accepted that they would need to engage in the diplomatic conversation according to the rules set by Athens. Thus, they sought to make the case that it would be in Athens’ long-term self-interest to refrain from engaging in conquest. When the Athenians massacred the Melians for choosing to fight, that was not a case of power making justice. Instead, it can be viewed as a case of power prevailing over justice. The triumph of the powerful over the weak does not, in fact, “make right”. As argued by Yale legal scholars Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, might unmakes right. Like the Athenians, contemporary political leaders who argue that powerful countries should use force to obtain their goals because they can typically set aside questions of justice rather than making the case that power yields justice

Thucydides account of the Peloponnesian War, taken in full, suggests a more trenchant question: Does might make might? The eventual collapse of the Athenian Empire after the Peloponnesian War indicates that might does not necessarily make might. The use of force by powerful countries in contravention of international norms and justice does not clearly preserve their power or serve their national interests.  Contemporary advocates of the logic of “might makes right” as a driver of U.S. foreign policy would be well-served to heed such historical lessons.